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Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The jurisdiction of this Court is based upon § 78-2-2(3) (j) and § 
78-2-2(4), Utah Code Ann, (1953 as amended) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was it proper for the trial court to impute acquiescence 
to a non-resident land owner? 
The standard of review in equity cases where the trial court 
has made legal conclusions and factual findings is the clearly 
erroneous standard. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a); Bellon v. 
Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991); Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 
1174 (Utah 1989). 
2. Was it proper for the trial court to quiet title to real 
property in the Plaintiff on the basis of boundary by acquiescence 
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where the court imputed acquiescence in the boundary to the Hanrath 
Defendant's predecessor in interest? 
The standard of review in equity cases where the trial court 
has made legal conclusions and factual findings is the clearly 
erroneous standard. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a); Bellon v. 
Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991); Bountiful v. Riley. 784 P.2d 
1174 (Utah 1989). 
3. Was it proper for the trial court to quiet title to real 
property in the Plaintiff on the basis of boundary by acquiescence 
where the evidence clearly established that there was no 
acquiescence to an established and clearly identifiable boundary? 
The standard of review in equity cases where the trial court 
has made legal conclusions and factual findings is the clearly 
erroneous standard. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a); Bellon v. 
Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991); Bountiful v. Rilev, 784 P.2d 
1174 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES & RULES 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This action was brought by the Plaintiff to quiet title in a 
parcel of real property on the legal basis of boundary by 
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acquiescence. The parcel of property claimed by the Plaintiff is 
included in the legal description of property owned by the Hanrath 
Defendant's since August of 1986. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The Verified Complaint was filed in this matter in September, 
1989. The Hanrath Defendant's moved for summary judgment in April 
1991, on the basis that Plaintiff could not prove the elements 
required for establishing a boundary by acquiescence. 
Judge Dennis L. Draney denied the Summary judgment in August 
of 1991, on the basis that there were "genuine issues of material 
fact regarding the occupation of the subject land up to a visible 
line marked by natural monuments, fences or buildings." 
The matter was tried before the Honorable John R. Anderson 
sitting without a jury, on November 19, 1992, and the Court took 
the matter under advisement at the conclusion of those proceedings. 
C. Disposition at the trial court 
On November 30 ,1992, the court issued its memorandum decision 
finding in favor of the Plaintiff and quieting title to the 
disputed property in him. 
D. Statement of Facts 
Plaintiff claims to be the owner in fee simple of the lands and 
premises described below: 
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Beginning at the SOUTHWEST corner of the NORTH 1/2 
of the NORTHEAST 1/4 of Section 20, Township 2 SOUTH, 
Range 6, WEST, U.S.M., and running thence EAST 2,640 feet 
to the EAST line of said Section, thence NORTH 1,320 
feet, more or less to the ledges located NORTH of the 
Duchesne River, thence WESTERLY along said ledges 2,640 
feet, more or less to a point due NORTH of the point of 
beginning, thence SOUTH 1,320 feet, more or less, to the 
point of beginning, Excepting therefrom that portion 
lying within the public road on the SOUTH thereof. 
The Hanrath Defendants are the fee simple owners of certain real 
property bordering that owned by Plaintiff and more particularly 
described as: 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 6 WEST. UINTAH SPECIAL BASE & 
MERIDIAN. Section 17: The Southeast Quarter. 
EXCEPTING therefrom a 30.0 foot easement for road and 
utility purposes. Reserving unto the Grantor all oil, 
gas, and mineral rights. 
This property includes land on either side of the Duchesne River 
and some rocky ledges and cliffs to the north. 
The Hanrath Defendants received the property by way of 
Warranty Deed dated August 23, 1986, from Barbara Shrader. (Exhibit 
25) Shrader and her husband (now deceased) owned the subject 
property from 1961 to 1986 while they resided in California. (Tr. 
163) The Shraders visited their property only once during that 
time, in 1974 or 1975. (Tr. 166) During that visit Mrs. Shrader 
did not observe any evidence that someone else was occupying the 
property or any fence lines on the property. (Tr. 167, 184) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Hanraths appeal on the basis that the evidence at trial 
did not support the conclusion that there was acquiescence to a 
boundary which differed from the legal description of the property. 
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A boundary by acquiescence requires mutual recognition by adjoining 
landowners and in this case, the Hanrath's predecessor did not 
acquiesce in any boundary. The Hanraths also allege that there was 
no visible line marked definitely by monuments, fences or 
buildings. 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT ESTABLISH A BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
The Plaintiff had the burden at trial of proving the existence 
of a boundary by acquiescence in order to quiet title in his name. 
The elements required to prove a boundary by acquiescence are: 
1. occupation up to a visible line marked definitely by 
monuments, fences or buildings; 
2. acquiescence in the line as the boundary; 
3. for a long period of time; and 
4. by adjoining landowners. 
Staker v. Ainsworth. 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990). Proof of each of 
these elements gives rise only to a presumption of a boundary by 
acquiescence. Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah 2d 282, 421 P. 2d 944, 946 
(1966). 
The Hanraths do not dispute the fact that they are adjoining 
landowners with the Plaintiff and that the property has been 
occupied for a long period of time. This appeal is focused on the 
Plaintiffs failure to prove the first two elements. If a party 
claiming title by acquiescence fails to establish any of the 
elements which give rise to a presumption in his favor, then he has 
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not proved his case. Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah 2d 282, 421 P.2d 
944, 946 (1966). 
The Plaintiff alleged at trial that the community has 
recognized the ledges, cliffs and old established fence line as a 
boundary to his property. At trial the Court heard testimony from 
several witnesses in support of this position. 
The law however requires that the adjoining landowners 
mutually agree on the boundary in order for there to be a boundary 
by acquiescence. Fuoco v. Williams, 421 P.2d at 947. In this case 
the evidence adduced at trial from the adjoining landowner, the 
predecessor to Hanraths: Mrs. Shrader, clearly did not support a 
finding that she acquiesced in Plaintiffs boundary. 
a. The adjoining landowner did not acquiesce. 
Barbara Shrader and her husband bought property in 1961 and 
held on to it for 25 years in 1974 or 1975 (Tr. 166) . They visited 
that property one time during that 25 years. Mrs. Shrader 
testified that at the time of that visit they did not notice that 
any one else was occupying the property they owned. (Tr. 167) She 
did not notice any fence lines or signs that the land was being 
cultivated. (Tr. 179, 183) 
It is clear from her testimony that she believed that their 
property extended beyond the river and included property on both 
sides of the cliffs and ledges. (Tr. 164, 183) Judge Anderson 
ruled in his Memorandum Decision that "the Shraders had a duty to 
visually inspect what there was to be seen. The Court concludes 
that their failure to do so carries imputed acquiescence from their 
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predecessors who could have seen the fences and the total enclosure 
to the cliffs North of the river." (R. 205) He cites no legal 
precedent for his ruling that acquiescence may be imputed or a 
finding of acquiescence made when the adjoining landowner does not 
have any knowledge of the purported boundary. Ms Shrader,s 
understanding of the boundaries was based upon the legal 
description and plat map of her property and it is the position of 
the Hanrath Defendant's that she was entitled to rely on those 
documents alone without a visual inspection. 
The Utah courts have used both an objective and subjective 
test used to determine the fact of acquiescence. The objective 
test relies on the parties' actions with respect to the boundary to 
determine whether there was acquiescence. Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 
2d 119, 505 P.2d 1199 (1973). In Lane, the adjoining landowners 
knew of and recognized the existence of a fence as the boundary for 
48 years, even though they knew it was not consistent with the 
legal descriptions of the properties. No action was ever taken to 
correct the boundary until the property values in that area 
skyrocketed. In affirming the trial court's decision that the 
fence did constitute a boundary, the Supreme Court found that 
mutual intent is not necessary for acquiescence. Id. at 1200. 
"... the test to establish the boundary by 
"acquiescence" necessarily need not be based 
on mutual "intent". "Intent" is not 
synonymous with "acquiescence" in these cases. 
"Acquiescence" is more nearly synonymous with 
"indolence" or "consent by silence," — or a 
knowledge that a fence or other monuments 
appears to be a boundary, — but that no one 
did anything about it for 48 years. Lane, 505 
P.2d at 1200 (emphasis added). 
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It is important to note that in Lane both parties resided on 
their respective properties, knew of the existence of the fence and 
affirmatively treated it as a boundary. While there may not have 
been intent, there was knowledge. In this case, Mrs. Shrader had 
no knowledge that the Plaintiff had erected a fence which he was 
treating as the east and west boundary to his property. Likewise, 
she had no knowledge that Carter was treating the ledges and cliffs 
as the north boundary to his property. There can be no "indolence" 
on "consent by silence" without knowledge of the purported, but 
different line. Without some evidence of her knowledge and 
acquiescence, there is no basis to find that there was a boundary 
by acquiescence under this objective test. 
A subjective test was applied in Wright v. Clissold, 521 P.2d 
1224 (Utah 1974). In that case, a fence was built to control 
cattle without the permission or acquiescence of the neighbor. The 
Plaintiffs then sought to quiet title and the Defendant claimed 
that the fence constituted a boundary by acquiescence. The trial 
court held in favor of the Defendant finding that the fence had 
been in existence for over 2 0 years and the Defendants and their 
predecessors had used the property up to the fence during that 
period. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed that decision and held that 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence could not be invoked where 
there was evidence that demonstrated that the fence was not built 
pursuant to an agreement between the adjoining landowners. Wright, 
521 P. 2d at 1227. The court rejected the Defendants argument that 
8 
where the parties passively accept a fence line as a boundary for 
the requisite period of time, the parties need not have a necessary 
mental intent that the boundary be the fence line. In other words, 
passive acceptance of a fence as a boundary will not establish 
acquiescence where there is no agreement between the adjoining 
landowners. 
The present case is much closer factually to the Wright case. 
Carter erected his fence and used the land up to the cliffs with 
out the permission or knowledge of the adjoining landowner, 
Shrader. There was no evidence introduced at trial that the fence, 
which was erected by the Plaintiff for livestock control and 
boundary purposes (Tr. 54, 145), was built pursuant to an agreement 
between adjoining landowners. "The doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence cannot be invoked in the instant action, since there 
was evidence that clearly implied that the fence was not built 
pursuant to an agreement between adjoining landowners." Wright, 521 
P. 2d at 1227. It is even more evident when the purported "line" is 
not a fence but naturally occurring rock cliffs and ledges impart 
no notice by themselves. 
The Plaintiff cannot establish the requisite element of 
acquiescence to the purported boundary under either test. 
b. There was additional evidence at trial that contradicts a 
finding of boundary by acquiescence. 
In the trial of this matter the Court heard testimony from 
both Shrader and her realtor, Clayton Wilkerson, that Carter sought 
to purchase the property in question from Mrs. Shrader. (Tr. 103, 
9 
187) In a recent case on the issue of boundary by acquiescence, 
this Court acknowledged that evidence that an adjoining landowner's 
attempt to purchase the property in dispute is contrary to a 
finding of boundary by acquiescence. VanDvke v. Chappell, 818 P. 2d 
1023, 1025 (Utah 1991). 
In VanDyke, the Court ruled that the fence which had been 
recognized by the adjoining landowners and the community for over 
80 years was indeed a boundary by acquiescence. Among the evidence 
they relied upon in sustaining the trial court's decision, was that 
the Plaintiff had previously attempted to buy the property which 
they were now claiming to own. "There was also evidence that the 
Chappells attempted to purchase the property. This testimony 
alone, if the judge believed it, was sufficient to support the 
conclusion that the Chappells understood that the property in 
question belonged to Van Dyke and the fence line was the boundary." 
818 P.2d at 1025. 
The present case involves an offer to purchase property, 
however it was the Plaintiff who sought to buy that which he now 
claims to have owned all along. Relying on the rationale in Van 
Dyke, this is clear evidence that Carter knew the property in 
question belonged to his neighbor to the north. In an effort to 
cure this problem he sought to buy the adjoining property at a very 
low price. Carter's conduct in making an offer to purchase the 
property is inconsistent with the position he and his witnesses 
took at trial. 
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In addition, Mr. Carter admitted in his trial testimony that 
he never consulted a map or had his property surveyed to determine 
the exact location of his boundaries. (Tr. 152) A reasonable man 
would have consulted with a map or survey prior to purchasing real 
property; had he done so the discrepancy would have become apparent 
immediately. Carter should not be allowed to claim ignorance of 
his boundaries to the detriment of the Hanrath Defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Hanraths ask that this Court reverse the ruling of 
the trial court quieting title in the Plaintiff and order that they 
be allowed full possession of their property as it is legally 
described on their deed. 
DATED this ^Q day of October, 1993. 
GREEN & BERRY 
'Ml UAC-
JULIE V.| LUND 
Attorney1 for Defendants Hanrath 
P-223-91\SUMMDISP.MEM 
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APPENDIX 
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EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENlL/W^ 
ROYDEN V. CARTER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHIRLEY HANRATH, SHIRLEY 
HANRATH REVOCABLE TRUST 
and HANRATH MARITAL TRUST 
UNDER WILL, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 89-CV-104-D 
Defendants. 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly before the Court for Trial the 19th 
day of November, 1992, before the Honorable John R. Anderson, sitting without a jury. 
Brandt H. Wall, Esq. appearing for the Plaintiff: Frederick N. Green, Esq. and Roland 
Uresk, Esq. appearing for Defendant. Evidence having been adduced, argument having been 
made, and the Court having taken the matter under advisement, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Plaintiffs immediate predecessor acquired the property in question 
from Abplanalp in 1964. Visual inspection of the property at that time evidenced boundaries 
on the East and West of the property to the cliffs which are located North of the Duchesne 
River and North of the property. 
2. The West and East boundaries were marked by a substantial and clearly visable 
fence for a long time. 
3. Adjoining land owners on the West and East considered the fences to be the 
boundaries. 
4. Plaintiff considered the fences to be the boundaries. 
5. Plaintiff considered the cliffs on the North of the river to be the boundary. 
6. Plaintiff, in fact, used the land in a notorious way for the entire time of ownership 
to the present date. 
7. The fences were attached to the cliffs; the cliffs were barriers and monuments. 
8. Plaintiffs predecessor had constructed improvements on the disputed area South 
of the river. 
9. Hanrath's predecessor purchased her property without a visual inspection in 1961. 
10. Visual inspection would have shown boundary enclosures. 
11. Defendant, Hanrath, gains no more right to the property boundary than her 
predecessor had. 
The elements as set forth in Staker v. Ainsworth. 785 P2d 417 ( Utah 1990) are set 
forth as follows: 
(1) Occupation up to a visible line marked definitely by monuments, fences, or 
buildings; 
(2) Acquiescence in the line as the boundary; 
(3) For a long period of time and; 
(4) By adjoining land owners. 
Defendants Hanrath concede that the thiid and fourth elements of the boundary by 
acquiescence have been met. 
From the findings of the Court, it is clear that the East and West fence lines have 
been in existence for a long period of time and were definitely marked and stable. The 
Court in its findings also determines that the cliffs are valid monuments and are attached 
geometrically to encompass the boundary of the property by the fence lines that were in fact 
attached to the cliffs that had extended across the river on both the West and the East 
boundaries of the property. 
The Court further concludes that there was actual acquiescence in the line and the 
geometric boundary of the property by Hanrath's predecessors. 
The language in Lane v. Walker. 29 Utah 2d 119, 505 P2d 1199 (1973) is 
appropriate. 
-2-
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"....To this we say that the test to establish the boundary by 'acquiescence' 
necessarily need not be based on mutual 'intent'. 'Intent' is not synonymous with 
'acquiescence' in these cases. 'Acquiescence' is more nearly synonymous with 'indolence,' 
or 'consent by silence,' -or a knowledge that a fence or other monuments appears to be a 
boundary, -but that no one did anything about it for 48 years " 
In the present case, the Shraders had a duty to visually inspect what was there to be 
seen. The Court concludes that their failure to do so carries imputed acquiescence from their 
predecessors who could have seen the fences and the total enclosure to the cliffs North of the 
river. In fact, Shraders did notice livestock "about" on their one-time visual inspection of 
the property, but they were "indolent" about determining the boundary. 
Based upon the above and foregoing, the Court will authorize the entry of Judgment 
for the Plaintiff quieting title to the boundaries that are enclosed with the fence lines to the 
cliffs as against the Defendant, Hanrath, and costs. No Attorney fees are awarded. 
The Court further grants trespass damages in favor of O.B. Carter, et al, the cross-
claimants, and awards damages in the sum of $1.00. No Attorney fees are awarded. The 
Court further concludes no cause of action on the Hanrath claim against O.B. Carter for 
trespass. 
Counsel for Plaintiff is to prepare appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment. 
VK DATED this ^ day of November, 1992. 
BYT 
JOHN R. ANDERSON, 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
-3-
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the Jofy^ day of November, 1992, true and correct copies 
of the Memorandum Decision were mailed, postage prepaid, to Mr. Brandt H. Wall, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, at Suite 800 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, Mr. Roland 
Uresk, Attorney for Defendant, at 47 North 200 East, Roosevelt, UT 84066, and to Mr. 
Frederick N. Green, Attorney for Defendants, at 528 Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange 
Place, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
Cheryl Wefiks/Deputy Clerk 
£*k» 
BRANT H. WALL, NO. 3364 
WALL & WALL, a.p.c. 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-8220 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROYDEN V. CARTER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHIRLEY HANRATH and MAGDALENE 
STEVENS, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 89-CV-104-D 
Judge: John R. Anderson 
ALL (A P C ) 
"YS AT LAW 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial to the 
Bench, the Honorable John R. Anderson presiding, on November 19, 
1992, and was concluded on said date. By prior Order of this 
Court, based on stipulation of counsel, Magdalene Stevens was 
substituted for Shirley Hanrath and Shirley Hanrath Revocable Trust 
and Hanrath Marital Trust Under Will, as Defendant. The parties 
waived final argument and jointly stipulated that the Court, at its 
discretion, could view the premises at a time convenient to the 
Court. The Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant, O.B. Carter, were 
present and said Plaintiff and Cross Defendants were represented by 
their counsel, Brant H. Wall. The Defendant, Shirley Hanrath was 
present and the Defendants Shirley Hanrath and Magdalene Stevens 
were represented by their counsel, Frederick N. Green and Ronald 
WALL (A P C ) 
INEYS AT LAW 
Ursek. Witnesses were duly sworn and testified, evidence was 
introduced, Stipulations were received and the Court, having duly 
considered the same and being fully advised in the premises and 
having viewed the premises, hereby enters its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff and Cross-Defendants, Carter, were and are, 
at all times material, residents of the State of Utah and the said 
Defendants identified as Hanrath and Stevens are residents of the 
State of Utah and this Court has jurisdiction over the parties and 
the subject mater of this action. 
2. On or about May, 1964, the Plaintiff together with his 
brother Osborne B. Carter, entered into a contract with one Pete F. 
Abplanalp and Bessie E. Abplanalp to purchase parcels of real 
property situate in Duchesne County, State of Utah and described as 
follows: 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 6 WEST, U.S.M. Section 
20: North half Northeast quarter. Section 19: 
Southeast quarter and Southwest quarter. 
Together with all improvements, appurtenances 
and water rights thereto belonging. 
Excepting and reserving one half of all oil, 
gas and other minerals. Expressly conveying 
unto grantees one half of all oil, gas and 
other minerals hereunder. 
3. The said contract was thereafter paid in full, and title 
to the premises was transferred by Warranty Deed dated May 18, 1964 
to the Plaintiff and Osborne B. Carter. 
. WALL (A P C ) 
WEYS AT LAW 
BOSTON BUILDING 
4. On or about the 6th day of August, 1969, Osborne B. Carter 
quitclaimed his interest in the above described property to the 
Plaintiff herein who is the owner of said lands. 
5. That with reference to that portion of the land identified 
as the North one-half of the Northeast quarter, Section 20, 
Township 2 South, Range 6 West, U.S.M., the said Pete F. Abplanalp 
and Bessie E. Abplanalp, his wife, and their predecessors in 
interest had for many years prior to 19 64, exclusively occupied, 
farmed, possessed and improved the same together with an area of 
land lying immediately north thereof which extended to the base of 
ledges and cliffs located north of the Duchesne River, such 
additional parcel being referred to herein as the "disputed 
parcel". The exact description of said parcel to be ascertained by 
survey. 
6. At the time Plaintiff "acquired said property from the said 
Abplanalps, he made inquiry of said Abplanalps and personal 
inspection of the property to determine the general boundaries 
thereof, and ascertained therefrom that old fence boundaries 
existed on the east and west lines of said property extending from 
the first tier of cliffs north of the Duchesne River, south to the 
north line of a state and public highway which included the area in 
dispute as well as the area described by deed in Section 20 
aforesaid. 
7. The west and east boundaries of said property are marked 
by substantial and clearly visible old fences which have existed 
4 
for at least 50 years and continue to exist to the present time, 
and Plaintiff and his predecessors have considered the fences and 
the cliffs north of the Duchesne River to be the boundaries of said i 
property, and have used said land in a notorious way for the entire > 
time of ownership to the present. | 
I 
8. That at the time the property was acquired by the i 
Plaintiff, no survey was obtained or otherwise conducted to | 
ascertain the location of the true boundaries nor has the Plaintiff j 
caused a survey to be conducted at any time since the acquisition ' 
of said property, and at all times, Plaintiff has relied upon the | 
monuments consisting of old established fence lines and the cliffs | 
immediately north of the Duchesne River as constituting the east, 
west and north boundaries of the property acquired, and Plaintiff ! 
! 
did not know the exact location of the true boundaries as described J 
I 
by Deed. | 
9. That the abutting landowners on the east, west and north j 
side of the disputed tract of land have, for a period in excess of | 
50 years prior to the claims asserted by Defendants herein, 
acquiesced in the old established fence lines and the ledges and J 
cliffs immediately north of the Duchesne River as the true ' 
boundaries of their respective properties. ' 
10. Plaintiff and his predecessors in interest have, since at j 
least 1920 to the present date, used, occupied, improved and farmed . 
the property which is in dispute, for various types of agricultural ' 
! 
pursuit including the raising of livestock, cultivation and 
<^L J i 
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harvesting of crops, construction and maintenance of improvements 
consisting of a barn, stack yard and fences. 
11. That the disputed tract lies contiguous to the north 
boundary of the premises conveyed to the Carters as described in 
paragraph 2 hereinabove, and with the exception of some irregular 
"cross fencing" to facilitate and manage the pasturing of livestock 
by the Carters and their predecessors in interest, no barrier has 
existed between the disputed tract and the parcel conveyed to 
Carters aforesaid. 
12. The east and west fences of the disputed tract have, for 
at least 50 years, been attached to the first tier of cliffs 
located immediately north of the Duchesne River and said cliffs 
were and are natural monuments and barriers, and are attached 
geometrically to encompass the boundary of the property by the 
fence lines that were in fact attached to the cliffs that had 
extended across the river on both the east and west boundaries of 
the property, thus clearly delineating the claim of ownership and 
the boundaries of the respective adjoining properties. 
13. The Plaintiff's predecessors in interest constructed a 
barn, stack yard and related improvements in the area south of the 
Duchesne River and within the area in dispute, and said 
improvements have existed thereon and have been exclusively used by 
the Carters and their predecessors for a long period of time to the 
present date. 
14. The old fence lines across the Duchesne River have 
o: 
routinely been damaged or destroyed by high-water and/or floods 
occurring in the spring of each year, and said fence lines have 
typically been replaced and/or repaired following each such j 
occurrence by Plaintiff and his predecessors. 
15. That the Defendant, Shirley Hanrath, prior to 1986, had 
occasion to be upon the lands and premises immediately west of the 
disputed parcel and on these occasions there existed a well defined 
and established old fence line which separated the disputed tract 
and the lands immediately south thereof from the parcel of land 
lying adjacent and west thereof and the said Shirley Hanrath knew 
that the Plaintiff was in possession of, farming and otherwise 
occupying the disputed area oj: land in a manner consistent with a 
claim of ownership. 
16. Hanrathfs predecessor in interest, Shrader, acquired the 
property in dispute and other land from one A. Fletcher Harris 
et.ux., without a visual inspection, in approximately 1961. A 
visual inspection at that time would have disclosed the boundary 
enclosures and the use being made of the disputed premises, 
including the raising and pasturing of livestock, cultivation and 
harvesting of crops, existing stack yard and barn, maintenance of 
boundary fences and open notorious use of said premises as an 
integral part of the total tract possessed by Carter and/or his 
predecessors in interest, also, the fact that the ledges north of 
the Duchesne River constituted a natural boundary and monument 
consistent with a general community acquiescence and recognition. 
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17. The said Shraders, who were predecessors in interest of 
the Defendants Hanrath and Stevens, visited the premises during 
1974 or 1975 and at that time noticed livestock "about" the 
property which is the subject of dispute in this litigation, and 
were indolent in making any determination of the boundaries of the 
property in dispute and at no time challenged, contested or 
otherwise objected to the boundaries and use as established on the 
disputed tract, and had they inspected said premises, they would 
have seen the fences and the total enclosure by the cliffs and 
ledges north of the river as natural boundaries. 
18. The land acquired by Shrader in 19 61, and subsequently 
sold to Hanrath in 1986, consisted of the Southeast quarter of 
Section 17 Township 2 South, Range 6 West U.S.M., and was 
contiguous to the north line of the property described in the deed 
to Carter. The vast majority'of the land in Section 17 was located 
on a bench or plateau north of the Duchesne River. At the time of 
the acquisition of said property, the said Shraders knew that the 
portion which is in dispute in this case was physically land-locked 
and that no access existed thereto by virtue of the cliffs and 
ledges lying between the Duchesne River and the remainder of said 
lands. 
19. For a period in excess of 50 years, the Defendants1 
predecessors in interest and the abutting property owners of the 
lands and premises claimed and occupied by Carter and his 
predecessors in interest, which includes the area in dispute, have 
& WALL (A P 
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acquiesced in the ledges and cliffs lying immediately north of the 
Duchesne River as being the geometric boundary between said 
respective ownerships; that in addition thereto, the said parties 
have known of the existence of old established fence lines which 
enclosed the east and west side of the disputed tract as boundaries 
of the area in dispute as claimed by Plaintiff and acquiesced 
therein as constituting boundaries of the disputed tract. 
20. Hanraths caused surveys of the disputed premises to be 
conducted in 1986, 1988 and 1989 which revealed a discrepancy 
between the record ownership and "as occupied" land. The prior 
owners of the lands lying north, west and east of the disputed 
tracts have historically, for a period of more than 50 years, 
recognized the natural boundaries and monuments aforesaid to be and 
constitute the true boundaries of the properties claimed by 
Plaintiff, and the predecessors in interest of the Defendants 
Hanrath and Stevens knew that the Plaintiff or his predecessors in 
interest were asserting ownership to the premises enclosed within 
the monuments aforesaid and remained silent and took no action to 
contest or object to the fence lines and cliffs which plainly 
marked the claimed ownership of the disputed area by Carter and his 
predecessors. 
21. Defendants Hanrath and Stevens gain no more right to the 
property boundary than their predecessors had. 
•3-2-;—The el-emsnts set forHinbfr-lSl^c^^ 
-4-9-9^ -j—are—apprapcr; and DefenddiiLs have cunceded—the 
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23. Defendant Hanrath has trespassed upon the lands and 
premises owned by the Plaintiff Carter during 1986, 1988 and 1989 
without just cause or right and by reason thereof the Cross-
Defendants Carter have sustained damages in the sum of $1.00 and 
are entitled to Judgment against the Defendant Hanrath for such 
amount. 
24. The Cross-Claimants, O.B. Carter and Randy Carter have 
not trespassed upon the lands and premises of Defendants Hanrath 
and Stevens and said Defendants have sustained no damages or loss 
for reasons asserted. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters the following Conclusions of Law: 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the 
subject matter of this action. 
2. Boundary by acquiescence necessarily need not be based on 
mutual intent. Intent is not synonymous with acquiescence. 
Acquiescence in this case arises, in part, from indolence and/or 
consent by silence for a period of excess of 50 years. 
3. The Shraders, who were Defendants1 predecessors in 
interest, had a duty to visually inspect what was there to be seen, 
and their failure to do so carries imputed acquiescence from their 
predecessors who could have seen the fences and the total enclosure 
10 
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to the cliffs north of the river. 
4. The East and West fence lines have been in existence for 
a long period of time, more than 50 years, and were definitely 
marked and stable; also, the cliffs immediately north of the 
Duchesne River are valid monuments and are attached geometrically 
to encompass the boundary of the property in dispute by the fence 
lines that were in fact attached to the cliffs that had extended 
across the river on both the west and east boundaries of the 
property. 
5. There was actual acquiescence in the north line in 
question and the geometric boundary of the property by the 
predecessors in interest of the Defendants Hanrath and Stevens and 
said Defendants gain no more right to the property than their 
predecessors had. 
6. Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree quieting title to the 
property whose boundaries are enclosed with fences to the cliffs 
and along said cliffs (disputed tract) as against the Defendants 
Shirley Hanrath and Magdalene Stevens and all parties claiming by, 
through or under them. Said premises to be delineated by survey to 
be conducted by Plaintiff at no cost to Defendants, and the said 
Hanrath and Stevens and all parties claiming by, through or under 
them, are hereby debarred, restrained and enjoined from asserting 
any right, title or interest in said premises. 
7. The Cross-claims asserted by the Defendants Hanrath and 
Stevens against Cross-Defendants O.B. Carter and Randy Carter for 
trespass are hereby dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action. 
11 
8. The Cross-Defendants, O.B. Carter and Randy Carter, Cross-
Claimants, are entitled to Judgment against the Defendant Hanrath 
for trespass, in the sum of $1.00. 
9. No attorneys fees are awarded to either party. 
10. Plaintiff is entitled to costs incurred herein in the 
amount of $ 
DATED this I fifr day of February, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
1STRICT COURT JUDGE 
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BRANT H. WALL, NO. 3364 
WALL & WALL, a.p.c. 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-8220 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROYDEN V. CARTER, ; 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
SHIRLEY HANRATH and MAGDALENE ; 
STEVENS 
Defendants. ; 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
1 Case No. 89-CV-104-D 
Honorable John R. Anderson 
: District Court Judge 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial to the 
bench, the Honorable John R. Anderson, presiding on November 19, 
1992 and was concluded on said date. By prior Order of this Court, 
based on Stipulation of counsel, Magdalene Stevens was substituted 
for Shirley Hanrath and Shirley Hanrath Revocable trust and Hanrath 
Marital Trust Under Will, as Defendant. The parties waived final 
argument and jointly stipulated that the Court, at its discretion, 
could view the premises at a time convenient to the Court. The 
Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant, O.B. Carter, were present and said 
Plaintiff and Cross-Defendants were represented by their counsel, 
Brant H. Wall. The Defendant Shirley Hanrath, hereinafter called 
Hanrath, was present and the Defendants Hanrath and Stevens were 
represented by their counsel, Frederick N. Green and Ronald Ursek. 
vW 
25'. 
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Witnesses were duly sworn and testified, evidence was introduced, 
Stipulations were received and the Court, having duly considered 
the same and being fully advised in the premises and having entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, Now Therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows: 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the 
subject matter of this action. 
2. The cliffs immediately north of the Duchesne River are 
valid monuments and are attached geometrically to encompass the 
north boundary of the property in dispute by the fence lines that 
were in fact attached to the cliffs that had extended across the 
river on both the west and east boundaries of the property. 
5. There was actual acquiescence in the line in question and 
the geometric boundary of the property by the predecessors in 
interest of the Defendants Hanrath and Stevens and said Defendants 
gain no more right to the property than their predecessors had. 
6. Plaintiff is awarded Judgment and Decree quieting title to 
the property hereinafter described against the Defendants Shirley 
Hanrath and Magdalene Stevens and all parties claiming by, through 
or under them, to-wit: 
That certain tract of land situate in the 
Southeast quarter of Section 17, Township 2 
South, Range 6 West, U.S.M., bounded on the 
south by the north line of the Northeast 
quarter of Section 20, Township 2 South, Range 
6 West, U.S.M.; bounded on the north by the 
first tier of cliffs and ledges immediately 
north of the Duchesne River; and bounded on 
the east and west by old established fence 
25 \ 
lines anchored to said cliffs and ledges and 
extending southerly to the north line of said 
Section 20. 
The said Defendants and all parties claiming by, through or 
under them are hereby debarred, restrained and enjoined from 
asserting any right, title or interest in said premises. 
The Plaintiff shall cause an accurate survey to be conducted 
to describe the aforesaid parcel, at no cost to the Defendants and 
said description shall be substituted for the general description \ 
j 
hereinabove set forth pursuant to appropriate Motion and further < 
i 
i 
Order of this Court. 
7. The Cross-claims asserted by the Defendants Hanrath and 
Stevens against Cross-Defendants O.B. Carter and Randy Carter for 
trespass are hereby dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action. 
8. The Cross-Defendants, O.B. Carter and Randy Carter, Cross-
Claimants, are awarded Judgment against the Defendant Hanrath for 
trespass, in the sum of $1.00. 
9. No attorneys fees are awarded to either party. 
10. Plaintiff is awarded Judgment for costs incurred herein 
in the amount of $ . 
DATED this /6T^ day of -February, 1993. 
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